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ABSTAINING EQUITABLY
Fred O. Smith, Jr.*
The doctrine of Younger abstention—which counsels federal courts not to
interrupt ongoing state criminal proceedings—balances dueling considerations. On
the one hand, the doctrine preserves federal courts’ ability to exercise Congressionally
conferred, properly invoked jurisdiction to prevent irreparable violations of the federal
constitution. On the other, the doctrine provides space for autonomous state courts to
carry out their traditional role in the realm of criminal justice. This Essay identifies
four central features of the Younger doctrine that maintain this balance. By protecting
these features, federal courts can ensure that Younger remains a doctrine of equitable
restraint, instead of inequitable abdication.
First, the Supreme Court has narrowly construed what it means to interfere with
an ongoing proceeding. Not all federal legal proceedings that run parallel to a criminal
proceeding should be classified as “interference.” Second, the Court does not stay its
hand when an underlying proceeding fails to provide adequate opportunity to raise
federal claims. Third, the Court has constructed a set of related exceptions to Younger
to ensure that federal courts do not abdicate their role in abating irreparable harm.
Fourth, the Court has rejected a general exhaustion requirement in Section 1983 suit,
except when a trial and appeal form the same unitary process. Put differently, a federal
plaintiff need not avail oneself of every available state proceeding. One has a choice of
a federal or state forum. Preserving this choice is crucial to ensuring that restraint
does not morph into total abdication.
There is a pressing need to reaffirm these four tenets in light of recent lower court
developments that have the potential to undermine the Supreme Court’s careful
balance.
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INTRODUCTION
The majestic, enigmatic phrase “Our Federalism” is a consistent
refrain in the world of constitutional law and federal jurisdiction.1
There is less written, however, about the case that gave birth to this
phrase, and the brand of abstention that opinion announced. Under
Younger v. Harris—and resultant doctrine of Younger abstention—
federal courts may not disrupt an ongoing state criminal proceeding
by means of an injunction or declaratory judgment if that state
proceeding provides an adequate opportunity for the aggrieved party
to raise federal constitutional objections.2
This doctrine reconciles two dueling concepts that animate
federal courts: obligations and restraint. Dating back to the early
nineteenth century, federal courts have long insisted that they have an
obligation to entertain federal cases within their jurisdiction,3 and to
provide federal equitable remedies that abate irreparable harm.4
Further, during the Reconstruction era, Congress extended those
obligations to settings in which state and local actors violate federal
rights.5 On the other hand, federal courts are also mindful of comity—
the idea that federal courts should show due respect toward, and avoid

1 See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race, Federalism, and Voting
Rights, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 113, 113 (2015) (“[T]he debate over ‘our federalism’ is a
longstanding one . . . .”); John Minor Wisdom, Foreword: The Ever-Whirling Wheels of
American Federalism, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1063, 1077 (1984) (“The New Federalism is
not the federalism of the Framers. It would have shocked Madison and Hamilton. John
Marshall could not have lived with it. It involves a recognition of states’ rights that seems
to extend beyond ‘Our Federalism’ of Justice Black.”).
2 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
3 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); see also Martin H. Redish,
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984);
Fred O. Smith, Jr., Undemocratic Restraint, 70 VAND. L. REV. 845 (2017).
4 See generally Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 687 (1990).
5 See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 504 (1982) (“The 1871 Congress intended
§ 1 to ‘throw[] open the doors of the United States courts’ to individuals who were
threatened with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitutional rights . . . and to
provide these individuals immediate access to the federal courts notwithstanding any
provision of state law to the contrary.”) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 376
(1871) (statement of Rep. Lowe)); see also Kellen Funk, Equity’s Federalism, 97 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2057 (2022).
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unnecessary friction with, the states.6 As the Reconstruction Amendments from the nineteenth century took hold during the twentieth
century,7 the role of federal courts substantially grew, an expansion
that was tempered by comity-informed restraint.
Younger abstention balances these competing considerations. The
doctrine ideally preserves federal courts’ ability to prevent irreparable
harm, while providing space for autonomous state courts to carry out
their traditional role in the realm of criminal justice. This Essay
identifies four central features of the Younger doctrine that maintain
this balance. By protecting these features, we can ensure that Younger
remains a doctrine of equitable restraint, instead of inequitable
abdication.
First, the Supreme Court has narrowly construed what it means to
interfere with an ongoing proceeding.8 Not all federal legal proceedings that run parallel to a criminal proceeding should be classified as
“interference.” Second, the Court does not stay its hand when an
underlying proceeding fails to provide adequate opportunity to raise
federal claims.9 Third, the Court has constructed a set of related
exceptions to Younger to ensure that federal courts do not abdicate
their role in abating irreparable harm.10 Fourth, the Court has rejected
a general exhaustion requirement in § 1983 suits, except when a trial
and appeal form the same unitary process.11 Put differently, a federal
plaintiff need not avail oneself of every available state proceeding. She
has a choice of a federal or state forum. Preserving this choice is
crucial to ensuring that restraint does not morph into total abdication.
There is a pressing need to reaffirm these four tenets in light of
recent lower court developments that have the potential to undermine
the Supreme Court’s careful balance.
In an article published four years ago, Abstention in the Time of
Ferguson, I wrote about a series of recent cases challenging state and
local systems that criminalize poverty. This Essay offers something of
a descriptive update. In the past several years, federal appellate courts
have rejected Younger defenses when plaintiffs have challenged
criminal justice processes that effectively incarcerate indigent persons
6 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
7 See generally Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 HARV. L. REV.
2283, 2290–93 (2018).
8 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
9 See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
10 Smith, supra note 7, at 2296 (describing these exceptions).
11 See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 502–07 (1982); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592, 607–08 (1975); see also New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans,
491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989) (“For Younger purposes, the State’s trial-and-appeals process is
treated as a unitary system, and for a federal court to disrupt its integrity by intervening in
midprocess would demonstrate a lack of respect for the State as sovereign.”).
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who cannot afford bail, fines, or fees. For example, federal courts in
the Fifth,12 Ninth,13 and Eleventh14 Circuits have rejected the
application of Younger to cases challenging rigid bail systems—that is,
systems that impose bail on indigent persons in pretrial detention
without regard to their ability to pay. These cases broke no doctrinal
new ground. They are consistent with the Supreme Court’s admonitions against applying Younger when a federal remedy would not
interrupt an ongoing proceeding, or where there is no adequate
opportunity to raise a federal constitutional objection in the
underlying state proceeding.
This doctrinal trend is showing signs of cracking, however. In
January 2022, the Fifth Circuit issued an en banc opinion in a case
challenging a rigid bail system in Dallas.15 That court expressed that
in a future proceeding, it wished to take “a fresh look at Younger.”16
The Fifth Circuit observed that in that future proceeding, it would
“have authority to re-evaluate [its] own precedent.”17
The developments have been even more ominous in the Eighth
Circuit, a court that the Supreme Court unanimously overturned less
than a decade ago for applying Younger too broadly.18 For context, in
the 2013 case of Sprint v. Jacobs, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Eighth Circuit imposed Younger abstention on civil administrative
proceedings in which that doctrine did not apply.19 The Supreme
Court explained that Younger abstention should not sprawl beyond a
narrow series of settings.20 In explaining these limitations, the Court
reasoned: “Federal courts, it was early and famously said, have ‘no
more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than
to usurp that which is not given.’. . . Jurisdiction existing, this Court
has cautioned, a federal court’s ‘obligation’ to hear and decide a case
is ‘virtually unflagging.’”21
In the years that have followed, the Eighth Circuit has continued
to apply Younger in ways that outpace Supreme Court doctrine. In
2018, for example, in Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming, the Eighth Circuit
dismissed a suit by Native American parents who claimed that their
12 ODonnell v. Harris Cnty., 892 F.3d 147, 156 (5th Cir. 2018).
13 Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2018).
14 Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2018).
15 Daves v. Dallas Cnty., 22 F.4th 522 (5th Cir. 2022).
16 Id. at 548.
17 Id.
18 Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013).
19 Id. at 72–73.
20 Id. at 73.
21 Id. at 77 (first quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821); and
then quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976)).
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children were being routinely taken from their custody without
adequate due process.22 Relying on Younger, the Court reasoned that
even if there was no adequate opportunity to raise the federal
constitutional objections in the underlying state proceedings, the
parents could file a mandamus action in state court.23 This outcome is
difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s rejection of an
exhaustion requirement in § 1983 cases.24
More recently, in the 2020 case of Dixon v. St. Louis, the Eighth
Circuit vacated a federal district court’s injunction that prohibited the
imposition of a rigid bail system on indigent defendants without regard
to their ability to pay.25 It concluded that the district court had
insufficiently weighed issues of comity, as well as subsequent corrective
developments in the Missouri courts.26 Among other cases, the Dixon
court cited the Jim Crow era case of Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman Co., in which the Supreme Court concluded that it should
refrain from deciding whether racially segregated railcars in Texas
violated the Equal Protection Clause, given that there was a potential
state-law basis to resolve the case.27 On remand in Dixon, the federal
district court declined to reinstate the injunction, concluding that it
was moot in light of Missouri’s policies aimed at correcting the
violations.28 And while that court ruled on mootness grounds, it also
appealed to comity. Citing Eighth Circuit precedent, it explained that
the “principle of comity takes on special force when federal courts are
asked to decide how state courts should conduct their business.”29
“The era of micromanagement of government functions by the federal
courts is over.”30 The Supreme Court’s extant Younger abstention
jurisprudence already balances these important comity considerations
with federal courts’ obligations: to entertain cases within their
jurisdiction, to uphold the republican commitments of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and to prevent irreparable harm. These recent developments in the Fifth and Eighth Circuits portend a world in which federal
courts superimpose an additional comity-infused “mood” of deference

22 904 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2018).
23 Id. at 613.
24 Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 498 (1982).
25 Dixon v. City of St. Louis, 950 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2020).
26 Id. at 1056.
27 Id. (quoting R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941)) (“Few
public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the
avoidance of needless friction with state policies . . . .”).
28 Dixon v. City of St. Louis, No. 19-cv-0112, 2021 WL 4709749, at *9 (E.D. Mo. Oct.
8, 2021).
29 Id. (quoting Dixon, 950 F.3d at 1056).
30 Id. (quoting Ahmad v. City of St. Louis, 995 F.3d 635, 642–43 (8th Cir. 2021)).
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on top of this careful balance.31 And while deference has its place, it
should not come at the expense of the four components of Younger
that allow federal courts to meet their obligations to intervene in
federal constitutional illegalities when necessary.
I.

RESTRAINING JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS

A classic debate in federal courts scholarship is the extent to which
a federal court can decline to exercise jurisdiction over a case that falls
within its constitutionally and congressionally prescribed power. On
one view, abstaining to exercise jurisdiction over a case can, as
Professor Gerald Gunther once put it, amount to “a virulent variety of
free-wheeling interventionism.”32 A generation later, Professor Martin
Redish wrote that “abstention doctrines amount to such usurpation”
of legislative rule, by effectively overturning federal statutes that
properly confer jurisdiction.33 He expressed particular concern about
doctrines that presume that “state court adjudication of federal rights
against the states is generally to be preferred to federal court
adjudication. These ‘total abstention’ theories would effectively
prohibit the federal courts from enforcing federal civil rights laws, in
particular section 1983, and from exercising their congressionallyvested jurisdiction to enforce those laws.”34
On the other side of this debate, there have been prominent
proponents of prudential and discretionary limitations on federal
judicial limits. Professor Alexander Bickel famously contended that
federal courts could invoke “passive” doctrines like standing and the
political question doctrine to avoid invalidating democratically
enacted legislation.35 Instead of upholding or invalidating legislation,
federal courts “may do neither, and therein lies the secret of its ability
to maintain itself in the tension between principle and expediency.”36
Further, Professor David Shapiro directly disputed the view that
declining to exercise jurisdiction over a case amounted to ignoble
usurpation.37 He contended that doctrines like abstention, exhaus-

31 Cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000) (quoting Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)) (reasoning that federal courts should engage in a
“mood” of state deference in habeas proceedings).
32 Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1964) (“[A] virulent variety of freewheeling interventionism lies at the core of [some] devices of restraint.”).
33 Redish, supra note 3, at 72.
34 Id.
35 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 111 (2d ed. 1986).
36 Id. at 69.
37 See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
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tion, and justiciability had “ancient and honorable roots,” and merely
amounted to an “open acknowledgment of reasoned discretion
[which] is wholly consistent with the Anglo-American legal
tradition.”38
This Part will document this tug of war in judicial doctrine—a
battle of competing principles that is especially pronounced in federal
cases about state wrongs. United States Supreme Court doctrine
reflects an attempt to balance these two competing sets of principles.
A. Obligations
A core assertion in federal judicial doctrine is that federal courts
are obligated to hear cases that fall within their jurisdiction. There are
at least two germane versions of that theme. First, dating back to
opinions of Chief Justice Marshall, federal courts have asserted that
jurisdiction conferred upon them by Congress and the Constitution is
mandatory.
Acting beyond properly conferred jurisdiction is
impermissible; failing to act within the bounds of one’s jurisdiction is
also impermissible. Second, federal courts’ power and obligation to
correct state actors’ constitutional mistakes is amplified by the
Reconstruction Amendments and the Reconstruction era laws like the
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.
The mandatory jurisdiction obligation. Two of the earliest potential
clashes of comity and jurisdiction came in 1821 and 1824 via Cohens v.
Virginia39 and Osborn v. Bank of the United States,40 respectively. In an
earlier case, Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, the Supreme Court held that it
had the power to review state supreme court’s rulings on matters of
federal law.41 The question in Cohens was whether the Supreme Court
had such jurisdiction over federal legal appellate claims emerging
from state criminal prosecutions.42 One of Virginia’s lawyers,
Alexander Smyth, attempted to distinguish Martin v. Hunters Lessee.
“[T]he case now before the Court, is very different from that of Martin
v. Hunter. This is a writ of error to revise a judgment given in a criminal
prosecution, and in a case wherein a State was a party.”43 The Supreme
Court ultimately exercised appellate jurisdiction, however.44 And in
doing so, Chief Justice Marshall relied in part on a robust endorsement
of the view that when the Supreme Court had jurisdiction, it had an

38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 545.
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 351 (1816).
Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 321.
Id. at 312–13.
See id. at 430.
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obligation to exercise that jurisdiction. “With whatever doubts, with
whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be
brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”45 He
added: “The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.”46
A few years later in Osborn, the Supreme Court relied on its statutorily
and constitutionally conferred jurisdiction to issue an injunction
against a state actor who, in violation of federal law, had seized money
from the Bank of the United States.47
Over the past two centuries, the Supreme Court has frequently
cited this mandatory view of jurisdiction.48 To be sure, over the course
of the nineteenth century, the Court has endorsed a number of
abstention doctrines that do invite federal courts to practice restraint,
even when they do have jurisdiction. Pullman abstention, for example,
encourages federal courts to decline to decide federal constitutional
questions when there is an antecedent unclear question of state law
that must be answered first.49 Colorado River abstention encourages
federal courts to sometimes stay a federal case when a parallel civil
proceeding is ongoing in state court.50 And as noted, Younger
abstention asks federal courts to decline to issue injunctions that will
interfere with ongoing criminal prosecution. But even as courts have
adopted these abstention doctrines, they have made appeals to federal
courts’ mandatory jurisdiction to explain why abstention doctrines
should be construed narrowly. In the 2013 case Sprint v. Jacobs, for
example, the Court cited its “virtually unflagging” obligation to hear
cases within its jurisdiction to explain why Younger abstention should
to extend beyond the narrow boundaries that the Supreme Court has
delineated.51 A broader invocation of Younger would violate the
45 Id. at 404.
46 Id.
47 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 871 (1824).
48 See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358–59
(1989) (“Our cases have long supported the proposition that federal courts lack the
authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred.”); Willcox v.
Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) (“When a Federal court is properly appealed to in
a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction . . . .” (citing
Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 404)); Chicot Cnty. v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893)
(“[T]he courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment and to afford redress
to suitors before them in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot
abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction.” (first citing
Suydam v. Broadnax, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 67 (1840); and then citing Union Bank of Tennessee
v. Vaiden, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 503 (1855))).
49 See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
50 See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976).
51 Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013) (quoting Colorado River,
424 U.S. at 817).
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Supreme Court’s “dominant instruction that, even in the presence of
parallel state proceedings, abstention from the exercise of federal
jurisdiction is the ‘exception, not the rule.’”52
The Reconstruction obligation. Whatever obligation existed in Cohen
and Osborn to exercise jurisdiction over claims that state actors violated
federal law, that obligation almost certainly found even firmer footing
in the years after the Civil War. Those years ushered in the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment, expressly prohibiting states from
violating equal protection under the laws and due process. Those years
also brought the passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which
codified the super statute commonly known today as § 1983. That law
permits individuals to bring suit, at law or equity, against state actors
who violate federal rights. Moreover, in 1875, Congress significantly
expanded federal question jurisdiction.
Early after the passage of these acts, the Supreme Court
recognized the significant shift that these constitutional amendments
and statutes had on the federal government’s relationship to states,
including its state courts. In the 1880 case of Ex parte Virginia,53 a state
judge challenged his conviction for willfully excluding Americans from
serving on juries on account of their race. He argued that the federal
statute giving rise to his conviction was beyond the scope of
Congressional power. Relying on the Reconstruction Amendments,
the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court explained that the
Reconstruction Amendments “were intended to be, what they really
are, limitations of the power of the States and enlargements of the
power of Congress.”54
Subsequent cases have reaffirmed the role that the
Reconstruction Amendments played in expanding the federal
government’s power to regulate states and, by extension, the federal
government’s power to enforce those regulations. In Mitchum v.
Foster,55 for example, the Supreme Court confronted whether a federal
court could enjoin a state court proceeding under § 1983. The
Founding-era Anti-Injunction Act purports to ban such injunctions
absent, among other exceptions, express Congressional authorization.
The Supreme Court held that § 1983 constituted the kind of
Congressional authorization. The Court explained that § 1983 was “an
important part of the basic alteration in our federal system wrought in
the Reconstruction era through federal legislation and constitutional

52 Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81–82 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236
(1984)).
53 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
54 Id. at 344–45.
55 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
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amendment.”56 The Court further reasoned that “Section 1983 was . . .
a product of a vast transformation from the concepts of federalism that
had prevailed in the late 18th century when the anti-injunction statute
was enacted.”57 In its view, “[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as
guardians of the people’s federal rights—to protect the people from
unconstitutional action under color of state law, ‘whether that action
be executive, legislative, or judicial.’”58 Enjoining such state actors is
authorized under the plain terms of § 1983; the statute “expressly
authoriz[es] a ‘suit in equity’ as one of the means of redress.”59
B. Restraint
Alongside doctrinal references to federal judicial obligations,
federal courts have also made frequent appeals to notions of judicial
restraint. Throughout much of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court adopted limits on judicial power while relying on concepts like
democratic values and federalism. In the way of federalism, the form
of restraint that has come to be called Younger abstention is one of the
best examples. In embracing that form of abstention, the Court
concluded that interfering with a state criminal proceeding is
improper when the plaintiff “has an adequate remedy at law and will
not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.”60 Among the
concepts the Court cited for this limitation was the “the notion of
‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions.”61 Famously, the
Court also asserted: “‘Our Federalism,’ born in the early struggling
days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our
Nation’s history and its future.”62
II.

YOUNGER’S BALANCE

Younger, then, is at a key intersection. Obligations to entertain
cases within federal courts’ jurisdiction—including cases against state
actors—date back to the earliest days of the Republic and are amplified
all the more by Reconstruction-era amendments and legislation. But
federal judicial doctrines have also expressed attentiveness to
federalism-informed comity, autonomy, and relative expertise. These
concerns are all heightened in the context of criminal law.
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 238.
Id. at 242.
Id. (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346).
Id. at 242.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971).
Id. at 44.
Id. at 44–45.
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One risk is that, without careful attention, judicial restraint can
turn to abdication. Without “safety valves,” a rule against any federal
judicial interaction with state criminal proceedings could result in
rules that deny victims of federal constitutional violations a federal
forum in some of the cases that fall at heart of Congressional goals
when it passed § 1983.
This Part will show how Younger doctrine aims to guard against
total abdication of federal judicial obligations in four ways. The failure
to protect any of these tenets creates an undue risk that restraint will
morph into abandonment of longstanding federal judicial obligations.
A. Interference Requires Interfering
The doctrine of Younger abstention applies when a federal remedy
would “interfere” with an ongoing state proceeding. Importantly, the
Court has narrowly construed that constitutes interference.
Parallel proceedings do not inherently constitute interference. In the
years after Younger, the Court made clear that for the state to establish
interference, it is insufficient to show that federal proceeding runs
alongside, or is related to, a state criminal proceeding. In Gerstein v.
Pugh,63 arrestees sued a Florida county that had been placing them in
jail for long periods without timely preliminary hearings. While the
county claimed that the federal suit violated Younger abstention
principles, the district court, Fifth Circuit and United States Supreme
Court disagreed. A judicial mandate of prompt hearings can coexist
with the prosecution of those individuals. The United States Supreme
Court held: “The District Court correctly held that respondents’ claim
for relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal
intervention in state prosecutions.”64 It reasoned that
[t]he injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such,
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial
hearing, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not
prejudice the conduct of the trial on the merits. 65

Incidental effect on future or non-party cases is not interference. The
state does not establish “interference” merely by arguing that a federal
judicial ruling will have an impact on other criminal cases. For
example, in Steffel v. Thompson,66 the Supreme Court held that “federal
declaratory relief is not precluded when no state prosecution is
pending and a federal plaintiff demonstrates a genuine threat of
63
64
65
66

420 U.S. 103 (1975).
Id. at 108 n.9 (citing Younger, 401 U.S. 37).
Id.
415 U.S. 452 (1974).
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enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute, whether an attack is
made on the constitutionality of the statute on its face or as applied.”67
Under those circumstances, invalidating a criminal statute will
effectively prevent future prosecutions of the plaintiff. But under
Younger, that does not amount to interference with an ongoing
criminal proceeding. Moreover, in Gerstein, the inevitable result of
requiring prompt probable cause determinations is that during the
course of other arrests, other individuals’ criminal proceedings would
be impacted because they would be able to avail themselves of that
right. Gerstein meant future individuals would receive a prompt bail
hearing. This kind of incidental impact on other proceedings does not
amount to interference.
This is a sound and important bulwark between restraint and
abdication. Whenever a federal court invalidates a state criminal
statute, or issues a ruling about an illegal practice in a state’s criminal
apparatus, there is always the possibility (or likelihood) that other
defendants will seek to avail themselves of that holding. Abstaining
that ground alone would place more weight on Younger’s comity
rationale than it can bear.
B. Adequate Underlying Proceeding
Another fundamental safeguard built into Younger is that the
doctrine does not apply unless there is an adequate opportunity in the
underlying state proceeding to raise one’s federal constitutional
claims. When the basis of someone’s claim, for example, is that they
have been held without a hearing, Younger does not apply. By the time
an arrestee could raise any such claim in their state proceeding, they
already will have experienced irreparable harm. Moreover, as I have
written elsewhere, “a structurally or systemically infirm forum is never
‘adequate,’ both because such a forum is irreparable harm and
because such a forum facilitates irreparable harm.”68
C. Exceptions to Abate Irreparable Harm
Beyond the general unavailability of Younger abstention when
there is no adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims, the
Supreme Court has identified some concrete settings in which federal
courts should not defer to the underlying state process to abate
irreparable harm. First, federal courts should not defer to a state
proceeding when the prosecution is a result of bad faith or harassment.
The bad faith prosecution is, after all, a part of the irreparable harm
67
68

Id. at 475.
Smith, supra note 7, at 2339.
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that the litigant is trying to redress. To ask a criminal defendant to
seek redress in the bad faith prosecution is to ask the criminal
defendant to subject herself to more of that harm. What is more,
where there is evidence that a bad faith prosecution is a form of
harassment of a criminal defendant, no dismissal of any single criminal
proceeding can effectively guarantee that the harassment will not
continue. A defendant under those circumstances may choose to
forgo constitutional protected conduct to avoid perpetual
prosecution, even if the net result is perpetual dismissals of the
charges. Second, where the state decisionmaker is demonstrably
partial, the Supreme Court may address constitutional challenges,
rather than relying on state decisionmakers to cure their own bias.
Otherwise, here too, Younger doctrine would essentially compel a
federal plaintiff to subject oneself more substantially to the procedural
harms they are attempting to redress.
Third, federal courts may intervene when there is not a timely
opportunity for a federal plaintiff to raise her claim in the underlying
state proceeding. In Gibson v. Berryhill,69 for example, when the court
adopted the bias exception to Younger, the Court was not moved by the
argument that the litigants could raise the issues on a state appeal. The
Younger doctrine “naturally presupposes the opportunity to raise and
have timely decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues
involved.”70 A federal court is not required to abstain “simply because
judicial review, de novo or otherwise, would be forthcoming at the
conclusion of the administrative proceedings.”71
Fourth, federal courts are permitted to intervene if the state law
being wielded against the criminal defendant is patently
unconstitutional in “every clause, sentence and paragraph.”72 This
exception has never been applied by the Supreme Court. I have
offered elsewhere:
Perhaps the best way to understand the exception, then, is to
understand the principle that animates the other exceptions:
avoiding the irreparable harm that attends a structurally corrupt
proceeding in which one’s constitutional interests are at stake. If a
statute is not only facially invalid but also so flagrantly and
indisputably unconstitutional that no reasonable person could

69 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
70 Id. at 577.
71 Id.
72 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971) (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S.
387, 402 (1941)) (stating that federal intervention would be warranted in the “conceivable”
situation in which a statute was “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional
prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against
whomever an effort might be made to apply it”).
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possibly conclude otherwise, this raises the question: Why is the
state wielding such a law against its populace?73

D. Exhaustion
A final path the Court has charted for protecting federal rights
under Younger is the Court does not require a federal plaintiff to
exhaust every available state-law remedy before bringing a federal
claim. To be sure, a criminal defendant is required to exhaust the
criminal appellate process before filing a federal suit that would
interfere with a criminal proceeding.74 As the Court has explained,
“[f]or Younger purposes, the State’s trial-and-appeals process is treated
as a unitary system, and for a federal court to disrupt its integrity by
intervening in mid-process would demonstrate a lack of respect for the
State as sovereign.”75
Outside that unitary system, the Supreme Court has never
required exhaustion of other state remedies, like mandamus.
Presumably, the general rule from Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida
controls in that setting. That case rejected a general exhaustion
requirement for § 1983 claims. The Court explained: “The 1871
Congress intended § 1 to ‘throw[] open the doors of the United States
courts’ to individuals who were threatened with, or who had suffered,
the deprivation of constitutional rights . . . and to provide these
individuals immediate access to the federal courts notwithstanding any
provision of state law to the contrary.”76
The rejection of a general exhaustion requirement—other than
when there is a unitary appellate process—is one of the most important
safeguards of Younger. A state could presumably always identify a state
remedy a plaintiff could attempt to seek: i.e., mandamus or a stateissued injunction from a court of general jurisdiction. But to demand
that federal plaintiffs file such suits is to effectively deprive federal
plaintiffs of the choice to use a federal forum to vindicate federal
rights, a choice that the Reconstruction Congress granted Americans
when they face unconstitutional state abuse.
III.

SAFEGUARDS ON TRIAL

In recent years, as litigants have brought federal cases challenging
state regimes that criminalize poverty, the doctrine of Younger
abstention has experienced something of a revival in prominence. In
73 Smith, supra note 7, at 2303.
74 Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975).
75 New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989).
76 Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 504 (1982) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1871) (statement of Rep. Lowe).
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2018, I contended that Younger’s “[s]afety valves for bad faith, untimely
proceedings, biased proceedings, and even patently unconstitutional
laws are united by that longstanding conception of the federal
judiciary’s equitable role. . . . The time is ripe to assess whether these
exceptions are working as intended.”77
Since that writing, a number of federal appellate courts have
addressed states’ arguments that Younger abstention should impede
federal cases challenging rigid money bail systems.78 In other
instances, federal appellate courts have applied Younger in legal
challenges to other systemic or structural flaws in a state legal process
in ways that have direct implications for the legal challenges to systems
that criminalize poverty.79 These newer cases present additional
opportunities to explore the efficacy of Younger’s built-in mechanisms
to maintain a federal forum for grave, irreparable harms.
This Part begins with cases from the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits that have rejected states’ Younger abstention arguments when
plaintiffs have launched challenges to rigid bail systems. The Part then
turns to cases in which states’ Younger claims have met more success: a
Fifth Circuit case which threatens to upend its earlier jurisprudence,
and a set of cases out of the Eighth Circuit. In some ways, the latter
cases do not so much suggest the need for the Supreme Court to create
new safeguards as opposed to the need to reaffirm those that already
exist.
A. Younger’s Safeguards in Action
In 2018, three federal circuits rejected the application of Younger
abstention to cases in which plaintiffs challenged rigid bail schedules
in state systems. The Fifth Circuit case of ODonnell v. Harris County,80
for example, involved a challenge to a money bail system in Houston
that fail to account meaningfully for criminal defendants’ ability to
pay. In an opinion by Judge Edith Brown Clement, the court
explained that for Younger to apply, “[t]here must be (1) ‘an ongoing
state judicial proceeding’ (2) that ‘implicate[s] important state
interests’ and (3) offers ‘adequate opportunity’ to ‘raise constitutional
challenges.’”81 In its view, “[t]he third prong of this test [was] not
met.”82 The court relied heavily on Gerstein v. Pugh, where the
77 Smith, supra note 7, 2304–05.
78 See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris Cnty., 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018); Walker v. City of
Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2018).
79 See, e.g., Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2018).
80 ODonnell, 892 F.3d 147.
81 Id. at 156 (quoting Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457
U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
82 Id.
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Supreme Court rejected the application of Younger because “[t]he
injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, but only
at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue
that could not be raised in defense of the criminal prosecution.”83
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit relied on the district court’s trenchant
observation that “the adequacy of the state court review of bail-setting
procedures is essential to ODonnell’s federal cause of action. In short,
‘[t]o find that the plaintiffs have an adequate hearing on their
constitutional claim in state court would decide [its] merits.’”84
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the application of Younger in a
challenge to a $1 million bail that a state criminal defendant named
Erick Arevalo could not afford to pay. In that case, Mr. Arevalo filed a
federal habeas petition (as opposed to a § 1983 petition) to secure his
release.85 The federal district court, sua sponte, applied Younger
abstention.86 The Ninth Circuit disagreed.87 Like the Fifth Circuit in
ODonnell, the court concluded that “Younger abstention is not
appropriate in this case because the issues raised in the bail appeal are
distinct from the underlying criminal prosecution and would not
interfere with it. Regardless of how the bail issue is resolved, the
prosecution will move forward unimpeded.”88 The Ninth Circuit also
reasoned that given the absence of an adequate state hearing to assess
Mr. Arevalo’s ability to pay, he was suffering irreparable harm.89 As
such, the Ninth Circuit held that the “case fit[] squarely within the
irreparable harm exception.”90
Finally, in Walker v. City of Calhoun,91 the Eleventh Circuit also
rejected the application of Younger in a § 1983 case challenging a
town’s rigid bail schedule.92 As an initial matter, the court observed
that “[a]bstention . . . has become disfavored in recent Supreme Court
decisions.”93 For that proposition, the court cited Sprint v. Jacobs,94
where the Court reaffirmed, “[j]urisdiction existing, . . . a federal
court’s ‘obligation’ to hear and decide a case is ‘virtually unflagging,’”
83 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975).
84 ODonnell v. Harris Cnty., 892 F.3d 147, 156 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted),
overruled by Daves v. Dallas Cnty., 22 F.4th 522 (5th Cir. 2022).
85 Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2018).
86 Id. at 764.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 766.
89 Id. at 767 (noting that Mr. Arevalo “has been incarcerated for over six months
without a constitutionally adequate bail hearing”).
90 Id. at 766.
91 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018).
92 Id. at 1255–56.
93 Id. at 1254.
94 571 U.S. 69 (2013).
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and “only exceptional circumstances . . . justify a federal court’s refusal
to decide a case in deference to the States.”95 More directly, like other
courts before, the Court found that “Younger does not readily apply
here because Walker is not asking to enjoin any prosecution. Rather,
he merely seeks prompt bail determinations for himself and his fellow
class members.”96
B. Younger’s Safeguards Cracking?
There are other cases, however, that suggest a pending circuit split
as to whether Younger applies to federal suits by pretrial detainees
challenging systems that impose rigid money bail amounts without
regard to their ability to pay. Notably, the Fifth Circuit has sapped
ODonnell of its precedential weight in the circuit. In January 2022, an
en banc Fifth Circuit panel considered whether Younger abstention
should block a suit by pretrial detainees in Dallas who challenged that
city’s money bail system.97 The court observed that “Younger has been
barely mentioned in most of the briefing. Working backward
temporally, none of the parties’ en banc briefing cited Younger . . . .”98
It surmised,
[p]erhaps the relative silence as to abstention can be explained by
the fact that our court’s first ODonnell opinion, which rejected
Younger abstention in the similar context of bail practices in Harris
County, was handed down on February 14, 2018, a month after this
suit was brought but before motions to dismiss were filed. 99

Given the importance of comity, however, the Fifth Circuit expressed
that on a remand, the district court should consider the applicability
of Younger.100 Mindful that the appellate court decisions are generally
binding on district court decisions, the Fifth Circuit instructed the
district court that was not bound by ODonnell, or any previous Fifth
Circuit opinion:
Our limited remand will give the district court the opportunity,
through such proceedings as it directs, to have abstention fully
explored, both factually and legally. The ODonnell court’s Younger
analysis is not binding on this remand. When the case returns,
none of our precedent will be binding on us. Thus, in light of the
district court’s consideration of the issue after the en banc court has
received the case, we give the district court authority on remand to
reach the result it considers appropriate even if it is inconsistent
95
96
97
98
99
100

Walker, 901 F.3d at 1254 (quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 77–78).
Id.
Daves v. Dallas Cnty., 22 F.4th 522, 529 (5th Cir. 2022).
Id. at 546.
Id.
Id. at 548.
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with any of this court’s precedent. What we have actually held in
this opinion to be the law, though, must be applied as precedent. 101

The court further explained that “[a]fter the remand, the en banc
court will take a fresh look at Younger, at which time we will have
authority to re-evaluate our own precedent.”102 Because the opinion
does not present a clear description of where, precisely, it believes the
ODonnell court erred, it is not evident whether the ODonnell opinion
will withstand remand and future evaluation from the Fifth Circuit.
Another jurisdiction in which Younger safeguards are showing
signs of cracking is the Eighth Circuit. In Dixon v. City of St. Louis,103
the Eighth Circuit reviewed a district court opinion that had rejected
Younger abstention in a federal challenge to a bail system that
inadequately accounted for detainees’ ability to pay. That district
court had relied on identical reasoning as ODonnell: “‘To find that the
plaintiffs have an adequate hearing on their constitutional claim in
state court would decide its merits.’ . . . Further, the ‘non-discretionary
procedural safeguards’ sought would ‘not require federal intrusion
into pretrial decisions on a case-by-case basis.’”104 However, observing
that the City of St. Louis had taken steps to amend its bail policies to
bring them into constitutional compliance, the Eighth Circuit vacated
the district court’s holding.105 In its view, the district court should have
given more weight to comity considerations in light of the city’s
revisions. It explained: “The district court, in fact, considered the
effect of the rule changes on the question of mootness. . . . But it failed
to adequately account for their effect on the question of whether a
preliminary injunction served the public interest in comity between
the state and federal judiciaries.”106 On remand, the district court
found that the case was moot.107
In some ways, the more concerning Eighth Circuit opinion
regarding Younger’s endangered safeguards is Oglala Sioux Tribe v.
Fleming.108 That case involved federal legal claims by an indigenous
tribe and Native Americans parents who argued that, in violation of
their federal rights, the state had been removing children from the
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 950 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2020).
104 Dixon v. City of St. Louis, No. 19-cv-0112, 2019 WL 2437026, at *9 (E.D. Mo. June
11, 2019) (quoting ODonnell v. Harris Cnty., 892 F.3d 147, 156 (5th Cir. 2018)), vacated
and remanded, 950 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2020).
105 Dixon, 950 F.3d at 1057.
106 Id. at 1056 (first citing Dixon, 2019 WL 243702, at *13 n.10; and then citing In re
SDDS, Inc., 97 F.3d 1030, 1040–41 (8th Cir. 1996)).
107 Dixon v. City of St. Louis, No. 19-cv-0112, 2021 WL 4709749, at *9 (E.D. Mo. Oct.
8, 2021).
108 904 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2018).
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tribe’s parents without adequate due process.109 The Eighth Circuit
ruled that this litigation could not proceed in light of Younger.110
That opinion was in significant tension with three of Younger’s
safeguards, however. As an initial matter, the court construed the term
“interference” much more broadly than the Supreme Court has. The
plaintiffs noted that none of them had pending proceedings at the
time that the case was filed: “According to the plaintiffs, they sought
only prospective relief aimed at future 48-hour proceedings, and the
federal proceeding would not interfere with a pending state
proceeding.”111 Putting to one side the potential implications of this
fact for standing under cases like O’Shea v. Littleton,112 the fact that the
plaintiffs were not seeking interference with any ongoing proceeding
should have been sufficient to defeat the Younger defense.
The opinion is also at odds with two additional Younger safeguards:
(1) the requirement of an adequate opportunity in the underlying
proceeding to raise federal claims; and (2) the Supreme Court’s lack
of an exhaustion requirement beyond the underlying proceeding’s
unitary process. The Oglala court wrote:
Although the plaintiffs complain that state court proceedings do
not afford parents an adequate opportunity to raise broad
constitutional challenges under the Due Process Clause, they have
not established that South Dakota courts are unwilling or unable to
adjudicate their federal claims. State courts are competent to
adjudicate federal constitutional claims, . . . and “when a litigant
has not attempted to present his federal claims in related statecourt proceedings, a federal court should assume that state
procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of
unambiguous authority to the contrary.113

The Supreme Court has never said that federal courts may abstain
because a plaintiff is able to file an entirely new case in a state court.
Indeed, if that were the law, Younger abstention claims would virtually
always prevail, and plaintiffs would be steered to bring these federal
claims in state courts. Extant Younger jurisprudence does not
countenance that level of abdication when plaintiffs ask federal courts
to correct grave claims of unconstitutional, irreparable harm.

109 Id. at 606.
110 Id. at 607.
111 Id. at 610.
112 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
113 Oglala Sioux Tribe, 904 F.3d at 613 (first citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430
(1979); and then quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987)).
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has constructed safeguards to ensure that
abstention does not morph into abdication. These safeguards include:
narrowly interpreting what it means to interfere with an ongoing
proceeding, refusing to apply Younger when the underlying state
proceeding lacks an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims,
applying exceptions to Younger that allow federal courts to abate
irreparable harm, and recognizing that Younger does not require the
exhaustion of state remedies beyond direct appeals that form the same
“unitary process.” Roughly fifty years after Younger was decided, those
safeguards are facing an important crucible in the lower courts.

